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THE HERMENEUTICS OF INDIAN LAW 
Robert A. Williams, Jr. * 
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. By Charles F. Wilkinson. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 219. $18.50. 
Professor Charles F. Wilkinson, 1 author of a new book on federal 
Indian law entitled American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Soci-
eties in a Modern Constitutional Democracy, is already one of the 
field's most accomplished and widely cited scholars. Besides numer-
ous influential law review articles2 and coauthorship of a leading law 
school casebook, now in its second edition,3 Wilkinson served as man-
aging editor of the recently revised Felix Cohen Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law, the only treatise in the field and one of the most influen-
tial works of modern American legal scholarship.4 (Wilkinson rightly 
states that Cohen's revival of the tribal sovereignty doctrine in the 
original 1942 work "was cited repeatedly by the courts and attained 
something of the weight of a Supreme Court opinion" (p. 58).) Wil-
kinson thus brings a unique set of qualifications and a comprehensive 
scholarly perspective to the task he sets for himself in this book of 
identifying and assessing "the central ideas - the undercurrents of 
doctrine" (p. 3) that have animated and informed the Supreme Court's 
contemporary Indian law jurisprudence. 
Wilkinson's long labors in the field of Indian law have reaped the 
rich reward of a book that promises to have a substantial impact on 
the way Indian law is perceived and conceptualized. American Indi-
ans, Time, and the Law succeeds in planting the principled and com-
prehensive set of justifications for Indian law promised by its author in 
such a convincing and powerful fashion that those concerned about 
* Marks Visiting Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. A.B. 1977, 
Loyola College; J.D. 1980, Harvard University. Member, Lumbee Indian Tribe. - Ed. 
1. Professor of Law, University of Oregon. 
2. See, e.g., Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: ·~s Long 
as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" - How Long A Time Is That?, 63 CALIF, L. 
REV. 601 (1975); Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 139 (1977). 
3. D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2d 
ed. 1986). 
4. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (rev. ed. 1982). Cohen's original 1942 
edition was called by Justice Felix Frankfurter "an acknowledged guide for the Supreme Court 
in Indian litigation." F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER THINGS THAT MAT· 
TER 143 (1965); see also R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLIT-
ICAL LIBERTY 112 (1980). 
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the future of America's Indian nations can only hope that it too will 
come to fulfill a role similar to that played by Cohen's famous treatise; 
that is, to tell the Court what the law is, and even more important, to 
tell the Court what the law should be. 
As its title implies, the framing, thematic device of American Indi-
ans, Time, and the Law is the passage of time and its impact on Indian 
jurisprudence. Wilkinson identifies four great occurrences which 
dominate American Indian law, history, and policy: 
[T]hey are the existence of aboriginal culture and soverei~ty during pre-
Columbian times; the location of separate Indian societies on reserva-
tions; the imposition of assimilationist policies, including the opening of 
most reservations to settlement by non-Indians; and the efforts of Indi-
ans during the last quarter century to reverse the press of assimilation by 
reestablishing viable, separate sovereignties in Indian country. [p. ix] 
Wilkinson's primary concern is with the Supreme Court's work in the 
Indian law field during this last time period, the past twenty-five years 
during which tribes have sought to revive their sovereignty. His thesis 
is that the Supreme Court's most recent decisions in Indian law can 
only be understood and assessed against the background of each of 
these zones of time, "of the relationship of each to the other, and of 
their relationship to the larger constitutional democracy" (pp. ix-x). 
"Indian law," says Wilkinson, "encompasses not only Indians and law 
but also time" (p. x). 
Wilkinson demarcates the modern era in Indian law as beginning 
with the Supreme Court's 1959 decision in Williams v. Lee. 5 In that 
case, the Court upheld exclusive tribal judicial jurisdiction (thereby 
denying the state court's jurisdiction) over actions involving contracts 
entered into on an Indian reservation between a non-Indian plaintiff 
and an Indian defendant. Williams' significance was in its require-
ment that the debt action be heard exclusively within the tribal court 
system in order to promote and protect tribal self-government (p. 1). 
Prior to 1959, no twentieth-century Supreme Court ruling had ever 
posited the value of protecting and promoting tribal self-government 
as a principled basis for decision. In fact, prior to Williams, there did 
not even exist a twentieth-century legal grammar that recognized tri-
bal sovereignty as a viable concept to guide decisionmaking. Tribes as 
cultural entities were regarded as historical anomalies which had 
somehow survived the ravages of progress. Tribes as significant gov-
ernmental entities had not survived (pp. 1-5). 
Since Williams' recognition of the viability of tribal sovereignty, 
however, the Court has found itself frequently adjudicating legal issues 
involving Indian tribes and Indian sovereignty. In the 1980s alone, 
the Court has handed down more than two dozen Indian law opinions, 
5. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
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a greater number than in many other fields such as securities, bank-
ruptcy, pollution control, or international law (p. 2). 
With Williams as his boundary, Wilkinson attempts to assess the 
Court's contemporary Indian law jurisprudence against the back-
ground of the major historical occurrences identified at the beginning 
of the book. His intent is to explore the "undercurrents of doctrine" 
(p. 3), describing what in fact has occurred in the past twenty-five 
years of Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence. His methodology is 
to use history to decipher "a principled and comprehensive set of justi-
fications" (p. 3) for the field. 
This is no easy task, as Wilkinson himself admits. His first chapter 
is in fact devoted to identifying the obstacles to the development of 
consistent doctrine in Indian law. These "scattering forces," as he 
calls them, 
have the potential ofcreating a body oflaw almost without precedent, of 
reducing each dispute to the particular complex of circumstances at issue 
- the tribe, its treaty or enabling statute, the races of the parties, the 
tract-book location of the land where the case arose, the narrow tribal or 
state power involved, and other factors. [pp. 3-4] 
These scattering forces present barriers to the development of uni-
tary doctrine that are difficult to appreciate unless examined closely. 
There are over 500 tribes in the United States that can make some sort 
of legal claim to special status or governmental authority under 
United States law. These tribal units range from the modem, rela-
tively sophisticated Navajo Nation, with its own government, police 
force, and statutory laws and taxing codes, to small two- or three-
dozen member bands of Alaskan natives whose primary activity is 
subsistence hunting and fishing. Each tribe has its own governing 
principles. Some embody these principles in Anglo-style written con-
stitutions; others govern themselves by more traditional means and do 
not rely on written charters. Some tribes hold lands recognized by 
treaties with the United States. Others have had reservations created 
by executive order. In many Indian nations the effects of past federal 
policies such as the General Allotment Act of 1887 have encouraged 
large numbers of non-Indians to settle within reservation boundaries. 
For other Indian nations, the term "Indian Country" defines not only 
the geographical but racial reality of the reservation community. Such 
diversity among tribes, their governing structures, and their geograph-
ical and political landscapes could easily press judicial decisionmaking 
toward ad hoc resolution. The lack of congressional resolutions of 
many of the essential questions respecting the scope of federal, state, 
and tribal powers in Indian Country only increases the enormity of the 
judiciary's task in carving out clear rules and principles of broad and 
consistent applicability in spite of these "scattering forces" (pp. 7-13). 
There exists, however, even a further factor which complicates the 
judiciary's task of crafting doctrine in the Indian law field. As Wilkin-
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son notes, "Indian law, more than any body of law that regularly 
comes before the Supreme Court, is a time-warped field" (p. 13). 
While this particular insight that the legacy of time plays a critical role 
in Indian jurisprudence is certainly not new, 6 Wilkinson's use of time 
itself as a normative hermeneutic device in assessing the Court's devel-
opment of doctrine in the field is not only original, but represents a 
significant theoretical advance for Indian law scholarship. 
Wilkinson argues that each of the first three great occurrences in 
Indian law, history, and politics - pre-Columbian sovereignty, the 
measured separatism achieved by the establishment of the reservation 
system, and the Allotment Era's modification of that separatism in 
opening up the reservations and creating equities in non-Indian set-
tlers and businesses - creates in its own right a set of considerations 
that are properly part of modern Supreme Court decisionmaking. Wil-
kinson, in other words, has developed a hermeneutics of Indian law 
jurisprudence which derives its interpretive norms from history. 
The key historical occurrence within this hermeneutical frame-
work is the establishment of the reservation system, mostly by treaties 
and treaty substitutes, during the nineteenth century. The treaty ne-
gotiations were normally conducted through interpreters, between 
peoples with radically different world views often on the verge of vio-
lent conflict (and often having only recently survived violent conflict). 
Their immediate goal was the securing of peace and the transfer of 
large amounts of Indian land. These were thus highly significant 
events in the collective lives of the two signatory nations, Indian and 
White. Given these facts, Wilkinson feels justified in deriving "the 
existence and meaning of certain first principles" from what was said 
and what was memorialized during the treaty ceremonies (p. 15). 
From his survey of the minutes and final documents produced by these 
negotiations, Wilkinson demonstrates that isolation of Indian societies 
on reservations of land was the common policy goal of both the tribal 
and federal negotiators. And, as Wilkinson shows, this first principle 
of a "measured separatism" (p. 14), together with its implementing 
and sustaining requirements of federal protection and provision of 
services guaranteed in the treaties, has been embodied in Supreme 
Court Indian jurisprudence from the beginnings of the nation. The 
principle of "measured separatism" thus provides a grounding norma-
tive foundation for Wilkinson's subsequent doctrinal analysis.7 
The Allotment Era, which opened the reservations to white settle-
ment in the late nineteenth century, irredeemably modified this 
grounding principle of Indian law. Under the General Allotment Act, 
6. See, e.g., Strickland, The Absurd Ballet of American Indian Policy or American Indian 
Struggling With Ape on Tropical Landscape: An Afterword, 31 ME. L. REV. 213 (1979). 
7. On the treaty-making period in general, and related United States legislation affecting 
Indian affairs, see F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 62-127. 
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the tribally held land base was eroded from 138 million acres in 1887 
to 52 million acres in 1934. Nearly three-quarters of the land lost was 
made available to non-Indian homesteaders under the surplus home-
steading provisions of the legislation. The stated purpose of the Allot-
ment Act was to "civilize" the Indian by breaking up the tribal land 
mass (pp. 19-20). In opening Indian reservations to white settlement, 
however, the federal government in effect foreclosed the prospects of 
any form of autonomous tribal rule in formerly separate tribal 
homelands: 
With the land base slashed back once again and with strange new faces 
within most reservations, tribal councils and courts went dormant. The 
BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] moved in as the real government. ... 
Christian missionaries were able on many reservations to drive out tradi-
tional religions or at least force them underground. The 1880s marked 
the beginning of a half century of twilight operations by the tribes, a time 
when the essence of the measured separatism - tribal self-rule - was 
debilitated nearly to the ultimate degree. [p. 21] 
Tribes have only recently and partly recovered from the economic, 
psychological, and spiritual devastation of the Allotment Era's modifi-
cation of the measured separatism promised by the treaties. The New 
Deal reforms contained in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 re-
versed the policies of the Allotment Act and created the necessary 
conditions for the widespread revival of tribal governments in the 
modem era.8 
The opening of the reservations achieved by the Allotment Era, 
however, represents an irreversible reality for tribes today. As a result 
of Allotment, non-Indians live and own businesses within these former 
separate areas. State and county governments provide schools, police, 
highway maintenance, welfare, and other benefits to Indians and non-
Indians alike on many reservations. Given this state of forced integra-
tion on many Indian nations, Wilkinson argues that the federal gov-
ernment's breach of its treaty promises of a measured separatism 
mandates that "the structuring of broad principles in the field of In-
dian law must also account for those reservations where the presence 
of non-Indian citizens and state governmental apparatus is strong, 
even dominant" (p. 22). 
In other words, the expectations of Indians derived from the treaty 
period may sometimes have to yield to the expectations of non-Indi-
ans, "premised upon open invitations tracing to federal law" (p. 23). 
While these non-Indians cannot expect to be totally free from tribal 
laws in Indian Country, neither can their expectations "fairly be ig-
nored" (p. 23). The Allotment Era for Wilkinson thus constitutes an-
other instance in history from which the judiciary should derive norms 
in Indian law. 
8. See F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 144-206. 
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This portion of Wilkinson's thesis, that a promise broken by a 
white government might somehow redound to the benefit of that gov-
ernment's white citizens, will most certainly give pause to most Indian 
people and their leaders. Wilkinson's choice of history as a normative 
framework for his analysis of Indian law must inevitably implicate is-
sues of collective historical guilt for past misdeeds and breaches of 
trust by one race against another. The idea of what America "owes" 
the Indian is central to American mythic and historical consciousness. 
But simply talking of the need for accommodation and reconciliation 
between the two races in light of the realities of our present-day situa-
tion ignores the historical realities which structured the present-day 
situation. Within any historicized mode of normative evaluation, the 
ways in which equities cut must always bear witness, in some degree, 
to the past. Just how much the wrongs of the past should be weighed 
in structuring present-day equities poses the fundamental issue of 
Western-derived jurisprudence of race relations and the post-colonial 
order. The haunting antinomy of the compulsion to forget and the 
need to remember remains as the residue of the white man's atrocities 
and holocausts committed in our own century and past centuries as 
well. From an Indian perspective, it is simply not enough to say that 
the judiciary should protect the expectations of whites on the reserva-
tion whose presence is possible only because of a century of dishonor 
on the part of the federal government. The fact that Indians are irre-
versibly fated to live in a society where they will always be a minority 
provides a more accurate, albeit less digestible, basis for a jurispru-
dence which takes account of white expectations in Indian country. 
When looked at in this light, the Allotment Era's impact must be 
viewed as of that same genus of racialist legislation by which whites 
once imposed their will on blacks. The structural inequalities result-
ing from that historical power relationship may well erect significant 
political and economic barriers that restrain judges from radically al-
tering present-day realities in pursuit of "fairness." But it is not a 
necessary corollary of that statement to say that these structural ine-
qualities must also serve as the normative foundation for judicial deci-
sionmaking. There is no need for a concept of a "rule of law" in a 
world where the outcomes of historical struggle and repression pro-
vide the definitive statement on the way equities should cut. 
Thus, as Wilkinson himself suggests in his book, conceptualizing 
Indian law within the framework of the Carolene Products footnote 
four9 would more clearly and accurately define the judicial role in pro-
9. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Justice Stone, in 
perhaps the Court's most famous footnote, suggested that special standards of judicial review 
apply when scrutinizing potential prejudice against "discrete and insular" minorities. Several 
constitutional Jaw scholars have made a virtual career out of the elaboration of this most obvious 
and fundamental human-rights principle, which at least merited a footnote in American constitu-
tional jurisprudence. For an example of the insights generated by Justice Stone's revelation, see, 
1018 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1012 
tecting the most discrete and insular of America's minorities (pp. 117-
18). That the white majority once promised Indian nations a right to a 
measured separatism that not infrequently has caused substantial in-
convenience proves the special relevance of the Carolene Products 
footnote to Indian law. The frequent breaches of the promise through-
out history serve to remind us that in the absence of the "rule of law" 
the majority will always seek to assert its interests against a minority. 
Thus, American constitutional jurisprudence's stated commitment to 
protecting the minority from majoritarian attack would seem to be a 
necessary corollary to a hermeneutics of Indian law that looks to his-
tory for the derivation of norms for principled decisionmaking. 
Unfortunately, the brute facts are that while Indian people may 
have their own conception as to what constitutes "fairness" in their 
treatment of non-Indians invited onto the reservation by a conqueror's 
policy of settler colonialism, non-Indian conceptions must inevitably 
dominate in a system such as ours. Thus, while Indian people might 
disagree with Wilkinson's balanced sense of realism in deriving norma-
tive implications from the history of Indian-White relations in the 
United States, his conceptual framework which seeks to generate prin-
ciples for judicial decisionmaking derived from history allows substan-
tial room for others to articulate and defend their own interpretations. 
The strength, as well as the considerable theoretical advance achieved 
by Wilkinson's thesis, is his use of history as a normative tool for shap-
ing jurisprudential principles. Others can argue for different principles 
based on different interpretations of history. Wilkinson has opened up 
an important new frontier in Indian law. Others can now mark off 
their own paths. 
The significance of Wilkinson's achievement can be most fully ap-
preciated by his analysis of Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence 
during the past twenty-five years. Wilkinson applies his own norma-
tive framework to what he calls "the challenge of the modern era" (p. 
7). This challenge arises from the judiciary's task of reconciling the 
two competing sets of expectations - Indian and White - on the 
reservation. Through an exhaustive and insightful analysis of the 
Supreme Court's Indian law jurisprudence during the past three de-
cades, Wilkinson demonstrates that while the Court has been sensitive 
to both Indian and non-Indian expectations, it has generally adhered 
to "the premise that tribes should be insulated against the passage of 
time" (p. 32). 
The modern Court has protected tribes that have become largely 
assimilated in the twentieth century by refusing to hold that tribal 
existence can be terminated by the passage of time. Only congressional 
e.g., ]. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Ely, To· 
ward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 Mo. L. REV. 451 (1978). 
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action can terminate the tribe's relation to the federal government. 10 
Tribal property claims have been held to be protected against state-law 
based defenses such as waiver, laches, forfeiture, statutes of limita-
tions, and adverse possession.11 And the Supreme Court has devel-
oped a particularized set of interpretive principles applying only to 
Indian treaties that requires Congress in most instances expressly to 
declare its intention to abrogate ancient, negotiated rights. 12 All these 
instances, Wilkinson argues, embody the principle of a measured sepa-
ratism promised in the treaties which the Court itself has sought to 
protect in the modern era. Old rights have endured, despite the pas-
sage of time, due in large part to the Court's principled adherence to 
the federal government's promises to the Indians. 
Yet while tribes in the modern era have obtained a substantial 
measure of judicial insulation from the negative effects of the passage 
of time, they have also sought to assure that their governments do not 
remain frozen in time. A recurrent feature of Indian law litigation in 
the modern era has been the efforts of tribal governments to revive and 
extend their sovereign powers far beyond those envisioned at the time 
the treaties were signed. In furtherance of their asserted right to 
change and grow, tribes have sought the right to tax on the reserva-
tion, 13 engage in economic development, 14 enforce law and order, 15 
and perform most of the functions and services of their non-Indian 
governmental counterparts. 16 The inevitable result of these exercises 
of Indian sovereignty is interference with the expectations of non-Indi-
ans affected by tribal actions. 
In resolving this set of conflicts between the tribe's right to grow 
and change and the settled expectations of non-Indians affected by 
sovereign exercises of tribal power, the Supreme Court, according to 
Wilkinson, has drawn from history in fashioning norms and principles 
to guide its decisions in the modern era. Directed principally by the 
Indian law scholarship of Felix Cohen during the 1940s,17 the Court in 
the modern era has adopted the essential historical paradigm of inher-
10. See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 476 (1975); see 
also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) ("The cases in this Court have consistently 
guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations .... If this power is to be 
taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it."). 
11. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); County of 
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
12. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
13. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
14. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); White Mountain 
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). 
15. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 
(1977). 
16. See generally pp. 107-10. 
17. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
1020 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1012 
ent tribal sovereignty which Cohen set out in his famous treatise on 
Indian law: 
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of 
decisions hereinafter analyzed, is the principle that those powers which 
are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers 
granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a lim-
ited sovereignty which has never been extinguished. 18 
Except for minor deviations, the Court has essentially adhered to 
Cohen's time-bound formulation that tribes were sovereign entities 
prior to European contact and "conquest," and that treaties and sub-
sequent congressional legislation diminished, but did not destroy tribal 
sovereignty (pp. 57-63). As Wilkinson notes, Cohen's formulation 
quickly "attained something of the weight of a Supreme Court opin-
ion" (p. 58). The significance of this fact for Wilkinson is that Cohen's 
formulation at its core recognizes the normative role of history in In-
dian law jurisprudence. It explains much of the Court's post-Cohen 
case law in the field, and at the same time offers a principled defense of 
that case law which should guide future decisions: 
Cohen's conclusion that inherent tribal sovereignty is "perhaps the 
most basic principle of all Indian law" is right. 
... It might initially appear that the powers of Indian tribes, say 400 
years ago, would have contemporary relevance, if at all, only within the 
walls of an advanced anthropology or philosophy class. In fact ... those 
times are not only relevant but controlling. The original status of com-
plete national sovereignty, not action by any European nation or the 
United States, is the beginning definition of modem tribalism .... [I]n 
the cases of the modem era the exceptions have proved far less impor-
tant than the remarkable and crucial premise - that tribal powers will 
be measured initially by the sovereign authority that an Indian tribe ex-
ercised, or might theoretically have exercised in a time so different from 
our own as to be beyond the power of most of us to articulate. [pp. 62-
63] 
The modern cases have in fact embodied and advanced the princi-
ple that tribes have as part of their inherent sovereignty the right to 
change. Thus, the Court has upheld tribal taxing authority on the 
reservation, 19 tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians,20 and other im-
portant governmental powers (pp. 59-62). The Court's starting point 
of analysis in all these cases has been the conception of inherent tribal 
sovereignty. Congress, of course, as the superior sovereign recognized 
in treaties, statutes, and case law, could act unilaterally to limit this 
sovereignty. But, as Wilkinson points out, the tribes' present-day 
18. P. 58 (quoting F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942) (emphasis 
in original)). 
19. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Washington v. Confed-
erated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
20. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Williams v. Lee, 
358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
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political sophistication in lobbying on behalf of their interests in 
Washington, together with the Court's own enforcement of the special 
"trust" relationship existing between the tribes and the federal govern-
ment, sustains important barriers of accountability that the higher sov-
ereign must recognize and deal with before engaging in too radical a 
departure from the fundamental principles derived from history which 
shape modern Indian law (pp. 82-86). 
The final chapter of American Indians, Time, and the Law is de-
voted to addressing the underlying tensions which the historical prin-
ciples embedded in Indian law bring into play when tribal sovereignty, 
insulated against time, runs headlong into modern political realities. 
Indian tribes' exercise of their inherent sovereign powers will inevita-
bly affect the interests and expectations of non-Indians. The judiciary 
in such cases, while informed by the normative historical principles of 
Indian law which guarantee tribes a degree of measured separatism, 
must nonetheless confront a set of broader concerns. As Wilkinson 
asks, "How can tribalism be squared with the legal and moral dictates 
of equal protection and egalitarianism? What is the role of the states 
in Indian country and of the tribes in the constitutional democracy?" 
(p. 89). 
To answer these questions, Wilkinson utilizes his historical, nor-
mative framework to articulate the principles that have guided and 
ought to guide judicial decisionmaking in the field. Focusing particu-
larly on the crucial issue of tribal versus state civil jurisdiction on the 
reservation, Wilkinson explains that the Supreme Court in the modern 
era has erected two barriers to state jurisdiction in Indian Country. 
First, where Congress has preempted the field by enacting legislation 
relating to discrete substantive areas of regulation on the reservation, 
such as commerce, criminal jurisdiction, or resource management, the 
state is ousted from any regulatory role. Wilkinson refers to this bar-
rier to state jurisdiction as subject matter preemption. In general, the 
Court has strictly construed Indian subject matter federal statutes to 
deny assertions of state jurisdiction, particularly with respect to the 
development of reservation resources (pp. 93-99). 
Wilkinson refers to the second barrier to state jurisdiction on the 
reservation erected by the modern Court as geographical preemption. 
"In the cases relying on geographical preemption there is no [federal] 
subject matter statute, only the general provisions of a treaty or treaty 
substitute creating Indian country, to serve as the basis for excluding 
state law" (p. 99). 
Because the Court, by excluding state law from the reservation, 
places the non-Indian state citizen under tribal jurisdiction without a 
clearly stated federal legislative policy to protect his or her expecta-
tions, it has used the geographical preemption barrier only "sparingly" 
(p. 99). Because the nature and scope of geographical preemption 
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have not been fully explicated by the Court, Wilkinson sets out to 
make "a principled examination of the manner in which Indian reser-
vations have been created in order to determine the forces that drive 
the geographical preemption doctrine" (pp. 99-100). 
Looking at the long history of treaty meetings and conferences be-
tween the United States and American Indian nations, Wilkinson re-
peats his earlier conclusion that the reservations were intended to 
guarantee a measured separatism to the tribes. He extends this basic 
thesis measurably, however, by placing these treaty negotiations guar-
anteeing a measured separatism within the United States' constitu-
tional allocation of authority. Treaty negotiations, claims Wilkinson, 
"are parallel in concept to negotiations with representatives of pro-
spective states over statehood" (p. 102). Both involve agreements be-
tween sovereigns over boundaries, lands, and authority. While the 
tenth amendment's reservation to states of those sovereign powers not 
relinquished to the United States does not apply to Indian tribes, the 
tribes nonetheless have similar protections guaranteed by the treaties 
and recognized in the Cohen formulation of inherent tribal sover-
eignty. There are of course few constitutional restraints on Congress' 
authority over Indian affairs. But under the commerce clause, spend-
ing and taxing clauses, and the fourteenth amendment, Congress can 
likewise freely encroach on state prerogatives if it has the political will 
to do so. Both tribes and the states must rely on the political process, 
as well as the courts, to assure that Congress remains accountable and 
circumscribed in such attempts at encroachment (pp. 102-06). 
From these similarities, Wilkinson makes a strong argument for 
viewing treaties and treaty substitutes creating Indian reservations as 
organic government documents with legal characteristics similar in 
many respects to the tenth amendment. Tribes are an undeniable 
"third source of sovereignty in the United States" (pp. 103-04), and 
therefore, according to Wilkinson's argument, "the rule of law re-
quires that tribes continue to be reconciled into our constitutional sys-
tem" (p. 104). The treaties, together with the clear recognition of 
federal supremacy over state authority in Indian affairs under the Con-
stitution's Indian commerce clause, "all point to a limited state role in 
Indian affairs" (p. 104). 
Once tribes are accepted as the constitutionally recognized entities 
that they are, with reserved governmental rights on islands free of 
most state authority, it becomes relatively easy to conceptualize issues 
of geographical preemption in Indian country. There ought to be (and 
Wilkinson's analysis of the Court's cases in this area demonstrates that 
there already is) a presumption against state jurisdiction where the 
tribe can assert that a strong and legitimate tribal interest is involved 
in the clash over jurisdiction between the tribe and the state (pp. 106-
11 ). The modem cases have already identified at least three areas of 
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legitimate tribal interests sufficient to stand as a barrier to most asser-
tions of state jurisdiction. These include the overriding interests in 
economic development of the reservation, providing services to reser-
vation residents, and setting norms as a community and adjudicating 
wrongs which occur in Indian Country (pp. 107-09). While the Court 
has imposed several limitations on these three interests, most notably 
the limitation on a tribe's ability to assert criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians,21 Wilkinson asserts that the tribal interest analysis "can 
efficiently and fairly focus judicial" decisionmaking on the geographi-
cal preemption question (p. 111). The strength of the tribal interest 
analysis is its emphasis on the reason tribes and the federal govern-
ment during the treaty era established Indian Country: to provide a 
degree of measured separatism, which, as Wilkinson notes, remains 
"the center point of federal Indian policy and law" (p. 111). 
Here also, Wilkinson's book breaks important new ground. Com-
mentators have been extremely critical of the modem Court's work 
respecting reservation jurisdictional issues. 22 Wilkinson has neatly 
clarified what the Court has in fact done in its many jurisdictional 
cases, with his insightful conceptualization of the contours of the sub-
ject matter and geographical preemption barriers to state jurisdiction 
in Indian Country. But he also has performed a far more valuable 
service by articulating a more comprehensible framework of analysis 
for these questions, which draws on what the Court has in fact sought 
to do, that is, to protect the treaty promises of a measured separatism 
by focusing on the legitimacy and degree of the tribal interest 
involved. 
The measure of Wilkinson's achievement in American Indians, 
Time, and the Law must be determined in the final instance by the 
book's strong faith placed in the judiciary and its commitment to "the 
rule of law." Wilkinson argues not only that the judiciary has pro-
tected the Indian's treaty guarantees to a measured separatism, but 
also that this protection has proceeded upon a principled doctrinal 
foundation, informed by norms derived from history, which should 
continue to guide legal analysis. Upon this argument the book must 
succeed or fail. Many Indian people might feel that given their present 
conditions of poverty and perceived lack of self-determination rights 
- in spite of the fact that the old treaties seemed to have guaranteed 
21. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), where the Supreme Court, 
in a majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, struck down the tribe's exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians on a reservation. 
22. See, e.g., R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 4; Barsh, The Omen: Three Affiliated 
Tribes v. Moe and the Future of Tribal Self-Government, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1977); Clin-
ton, State Power Over Indian Reservations: A Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 
S.D. L. REV. 434 (1981); Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limita-
tions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984); Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 OR. L. 
REV. 29 (1983); see also Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of 
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219. 
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so much more - Wilkinson's faith in the judiciary and the rule of law 
is extremely misplaced. The judiciary's failure during the Allotment 
Era to enforce the treaties fully, after all, led to the breach of the 
promise of a measured separatism guaranteed by the treaties. The 
white man's judges and their rule of law might seem to many Indian 
people primarily responsible for their present conditions. 
It could be argued, however, that this view itself is too narrowly 
time-bound and does not take sufficient account of the fact that, in a 
world of relative values, the white man's rule of law as interpreted by 
judges in the United States has resulted in the undeniable fact, pointed 
to by Wilkinson, that "the policy of the United States towards its na-
tive people is one of the most progressive of any nation. This is partic-
ularly true of judge-made law. As a result, the doctrines developed 
here can be instructive - and in some cases can be rallying cries -
elsewhere" (p. 5; footnote omitted). 
Relatively speaking, that Indian people in the United States have 
survived, and that their survival has been facilitated in part by a non-
Indian judiciary's commitment to the concept of a rule of law, should 
not go unnoted. The achievement represented by Professor Wilkin-
son's American Indians, Time, and the Law is that not only is this 
commitment recognized, but it is put forward in such a profound and 
forceful manner that it should serve as a signal reminder to all those 
who participate in the future making of America's Indian law. 
